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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRENDA J. MARSHALL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)

Case No. 20040457-CA

O. STEWART PIERCE,
)

Defendant and Appellee.
)

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22(3)0) and(4) and Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UCA.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
A. ISSUE: IS THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT? (Point 1)
STANDARD OF REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The
standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard as being against the clear weight of
the evidence. Rule 52(a) URCP and Young v. Young , 979 P2d 338 (Utah 1999). This
error was preserved in the lower court by Motion for New Trial (R. 269-270) and

Memorandum Opposing Judgment of No Cause of Action. (R. 289, 292-298, 365:18).
B. ISSUE: DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE
FINDINGS? (Point 2)
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The
lower court found that there is no objective test for myofascial pain, and thus the issue is
the meaning of the term "objective findings" which is a question of law reviewed for
correctness with no deference given to the determination of the lower court. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Error was preserved by Motion for New Trial (R. 269270) and by Memorandum Opposing No Cause of Action Judgment (R. 289, 292-298).
C. ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
GENERAL DAMAGES? (Point 3)
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The
standard of review is that the appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and
reverses only if there is no reasonable basis to support that action. Crookstonv. Fire Ins.
Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). The lower court shall grant a new trial if it appears that
the verdict was inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts or law or such is against the clear
weight of the evidence. Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940), Chatelain
v. Thackeray. 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (1940) and Crookston. supra. This error was
preserved by Motion for New Trail. (R.269-270,273)
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D. ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
SPECIAL DAMAGES? (Point 4)
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The
standard of review is that the appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and
reverses only if there is no reasonable basis to support that action. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). The lower court shall grant a new trial if it appears that
the verdict was inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts or law or such is against the clear
weight of the evidence. Saltas v. Affleck, supra. Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra and
Crookston. supra. This error was preserved by Motion for New Trial. (R. 269-270, 279)
E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11, RELATING TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY, AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING INJURY
AND LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC? (Point 5A, 5B and
5C)
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
Reviewed for correctness with no deference to lower court. State v. Pena. supra. Error
preserved when court refused to give Plaintiffs Requested Instructions 16 ( R.134), 15
( R. 133) and 11 ( R. 129) as part of instructions given to the jury ( R. 185-222)
and by plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. (R.269-270, 280-283)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES

3

Section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA:
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has
sustained one or more of the following:
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
Section 49-21-401(6) UCA:
"'Objective medical impairment1 means an impairment resulting from an
injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on
accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective
complaints."
Section 41-6-73 UCA:
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-ofway to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Rule 49(a), URCP (Relevant portion):
"...If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or
by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury.
As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding;
or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord
with the judgment on the special verdict."
Rule 201(d), Utah Rules of Evidence:
"When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary information."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

4

This is an action in which plaintiff seeks damages for defendant's
negligence proximately causing an automobile collision between plaintiff and defendant
resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant
made a motion for judgment of no cause of action alleging that plaintiff had not proved
permanent injuries nor met the $3,000 personal injury threshold as provided in Section
31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA ( R 232-233). The lower court granted said motion (R. 318320). Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial (R. 269-270) which was denied, and as part
of the order of denial, the lower court made four findings of fact ( R.348-350). Plaintiff
timely appealed the said judgment and the order denying motion for new trail in their
entirety.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action, and denied
plaintiffs motion for a new trial, and as part of said order denying plaintiffs motion for a
new trial made four findings of fact. Plaintiff timely appealed from the said judgment and
from the order denying motion for a new trial in their entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. This is an action for damages sustained by plaintiff in an automobile
collision which occurred on September 19, 1998. Plaintiff was traveling South on State
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Street at or about the intersection of State Street and Creek Road and going 40 mph at the
time of the collision. (Tr. 363: 76). Defendant was traveling in the opposite direction and
stopped to turn left and then proceeded in a westerly direction. Southbound traffic in the
inside lane stopped to allow defendant to turn left. Defendant turned left across the lane
where traffic had stopped, but proceeded into the outside lane in which plaintiffs car was
traveling without yielding to plaintiff and collided with plaintiffs car. (Tr. 363: 74-78)
Damages to plaintiffs vehicle were approx. $2,000.00. (Tr. 363: 69)
2. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her back. Plaintiff had sustained two prior
on-the-job injuries to her back that year, but had substantially recovered from them at the
time of this automobile collision. (Tr. 363: 74 and 162)
3. The action was tried to a jury on January 7, and 8, 2004. The jury
returned a verdict in which the jury found:
A. That defendant was negligent.
B. That such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff s
injuries. Fault apportioned to defendant was 90%.
C. The plaintiff was awarded special damages of $2,100.00.
D. Plaintiff was awarded no amount for future specials.
E. Plaintiff was awarded $2,200 for general damages. ( R. 223-224)
4. Three expert witnesses were called as witnesses to the injuries sustained
by plaintiff, Dr. David Petron, Dr. Joel Dall, and Dr. Jeffrey Chung. Dr. Dallfs testimony
was that plaintiffs injuries were permanent (Tr. 364: 187-189). Dr. Chung, defendants
expert, stated clearly that plaintiff was not going to get better (Ex. C pages 12-14, Ex. C
Supplemental Report page 2). Dr. Petron testified that in his opinion plaintiff injuries
6

from the collision were permanent (Ex. 2, last page), and that plaintiff would have
completely recovered from her previous injuries but for the auto collision (Tr. 363: 172).
Dr. Dall testified that the auto collision caused her permanent injuries (Tr.364: 187-189).
Dr. Chung on the other hand testified that the auto collision was 30 % responsible for her
permanent injuries or in the alternative that the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the
automobile collision were only temporary (Ex. C and Tr. 364: 233-237 and 251). Dr.
Chung further testified that in his opinion the treatment plaintiff received from the time of
the auto collision in September through the end of 1998 was necessitated by the auto
collision (Tr.364: 233-237).
5. The uncontradicted testimony at the trial was that plaintiffs special
damages incurred after the automobile collision were $6,305.37. (Exhibits 4, 5, 7, 9 and
10).
6. Defendant made a post-trial motion for entry of judgment of no cause of
action (R. 232-233). That motion was briefed by the parties, but granted without oral
argument (R. 318-320).
7. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was briefed by the parties and
argued orally to the court. At the conclusion of such argument, the court denied the
motion, and as part of the order denying said motion made "findings of fact" pursuant to
Rule 49(a) URCP as follows which are set forth in full in Point 2 hereafter.
Other facts are set forth in the body of the arguments relating thereto.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT 1. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE
IS THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT.
The main issue in this case is whether plaintiffs injuries were permanent
or only temporary. If permanent, then the verdict of the jury in this action of $2,200
general damages for a lifetime of pain and suffering is clearly insufficient. Furthermore,
even that small award was taken from plaintiff because the lower court ruled that plaintiff
had failed to prove that the injuries received in the automobile collision were permanent.
Plaintiff has marshaled the evidence supporting a finding of temporary
injury. The only such evidence came from defendant's expert, Dr. Jeff B. Chung, an
orthopedic specialist. Dr. Chung in oral testimony advanced two alternate theories which
he likened to a glass Vi full or a glass lA empty. He said is was reasonable to view the
injuries sustained by plaintiff in the automobile collision as being merely a temporary
exacerbation of a pre-existing injury. He said it was also reasonable to view plaintiffs
injuries as being permanent in nature and caused 30 % by the automobile collision and 70
% by other unrelated injuries. Dr. Chung testified that it is impossible to know which
version is correct, and that he has no preference. Dr. Chung's prior written report does not
mention the temporary injury theory.
Plaintiff argues that this is not a medical opinion upon which a judge or jury
can find temporary injuries. What Dr. Chung said was that the injuries are temporary or
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they are permanent. The jury knows that much without Dr. Chung's testimony. All his
testimony does no more than invite the jury to speculate.
On the other hand in this point we summarize the evidence in favor of a
finding of permanent injury, including Dr. Chung's own testimony on the permanent
nature of plaintiff s injuries, and the testimony of plaintiff s orthopedic experts, Dr. Joel
T. Dall and Dr. David J. Petron. Dr. Dall's testimony was that the plaintiffs injuries were
caused by the automobile collision and that they were permanent. Dr. Petron's opinion
was that plaintiffs condition "will likely persist" and that but for the automobile collision,
plaintiff would have fully recovered from her prior injuries. The clear weight of the
evidence is that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were permanent.
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE FINDINGS.
All of the experts were of the opinion that plaintiffs pain was caused by
myofascial injuries. The court made a finding that such injuries cannot be established by
"objective findings," and that plaintiff had failed to meet the threshold requirement of
Section 31A-22-3 09(1 )(a) UCA requiring proof of permanent injury based upon
"objective" findings. In reaching this determination, the court probably relied upon
testimony at trial by Dr. Chung that any finding which was contributed to by the patient or
over which the patient had any control was subjective and not objective.
Plaintiff believes that the meaning of the term "objective findings" is that
such findings not be based only on what the patient says, but rather a finding is objective
9

if it is the result of the physician's own examination and is the kind finding which a
physician relies on to prescribe treatment. Such a finding does not lose its "objectivity"
just because a patient has in some way contributed to it. Finally, the permanent nature of
plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision are repeatedly established, recorded and
reported by all three experts through their own "objective" examinations.
POINT 3 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
GENERAL DAMAGES.
In Point 3, plaintiff argues that the decision of the lower court not to grant
plaintiff a new trial appears clearly to have been largely based upon the courts erroneous
belief that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were only temporary, and in
any event not capable of any proof by objective findings. We argue in Points 1 and 2
above that these conclusions of the lower court are erroneous, and therefor the failure to
grant a new trail is really an issue of law reviewed for correctness, and that if plaintiff is
correct that the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiff injuries from the automobile
collision were permanent as shown by objective findings, then the jury verdict is clearly
inadequate appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and
further it appears clearly that the jury misconceived the evidence and the law, and that
their verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence.

In addition, the lower court

found that the jury had believed Dr. Chung's temporary injury argument, and the lower
court itself felt such temporary injury theory to be established by the weight of the
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evidence. Plaintiff argues that the lower court is in error on both counts, and that there is
no reasonable basis to support the lower court's denial of plaintiff s motion for a new trial.
POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
SPECIAL DAMAGES.
The jury awarded $2,100 in special damages and nothing for future specials.
Plaintiff argues that a new trial should have been granted for the same reasons as set out in
Point 1 because of the inadequacy of the jury's award of special damages and because of
lack of any award for future specials. The parties stipulated that the special damages
incurred by plaintiff after the motor vehicle accident were $6,305.37. The only testimony
on future specials was that of Dr. Dall who testified that future specials would probably be
incurred about the same as in the past. Plaintiff argues that there is no basis for
apportioning the medical expenses incurred by plaintiff after the accident between the
various episodes of injury. There is no way the jury could say that a certain bill is incurred
because of plaintiff s first lifting injury, or because of her second lifting injury. A medical
consultation or medication is required by plaintiff for her entire condition which is one
condition. Plaintiff argues that under Utah law, if apportionment is not possible, the
defendant is responsible for all medical expenses incurred.
Plaintiff further argues that even defendant's expert Dr. Chung testified that
all expenses incurred from the time of the subject motor vehicle collision to December 18,
1998, were incurred because of that collision and this amount plus even 30% of the bills
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incurred thereafter to date of trial amounted to at least $3,190.30. No less than that amount
should have been awarded by the jury, and that amount alone would have precluded
dismissing this case for failure to meet the threshold under Section 31A-22-309(1 )(a) UCA.
POINT 5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11.
A. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 RELATING TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY.
Plaintiff argues that the court should have given Plaintiffs Requested
Instruction No. 16 which would have instructed the jury that plaintiffs life expectancy was
25.3 years. Plaintiff was entitled to that instruction so that the jury would know how many
years of suffering plaintiff would likely have to endure because of her permanent injuries.
Plaintiffs requested instruction was in proper form and was based upon the table in Am Jur
2nd Desk Book, which was a reliable and accepted source therefore, and failure to give this
instruction was prejudicial error.
B. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 RELATING TO
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING INJURY.
Plaintiff argues that the court erred in not giving Plaintiffs Requested
Instruction No. 15 relating to pre-existing injuries which have become substantially
asymptomatic. Plaintiff s Requested Instruction No. 15 was based upon MUJI 27.7. The
instruction given was based on MUJI 27.6. The difference is that under 27.7 the tortfeasor
who aggravates a preexisting condition which is dormant or asymptomatic is responsible
for all of the ensuing pain, whereas under 27.6, the tortfeasor is only liable for the pain the
12

is attributable to the later injury. Whether plaintiff had substantially recovered from her
prior injures was a disputed issue of fact. Plaintiff claimed that she had so recovered and
the testimony of plaintiff s experts supported her position, whereas defendant argued that
she had not substantially so recovered. Nevertheless, plaintiff was entitled to have the law
governing her theory of the case (which was supported by substantial, competent evidence)
given to the jury. This was not done and constitutes prejudicial error.
C. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 RELATING TO
LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC.
The lower court refused to give Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No 11 in
full. The court gave the first portion thereof, but refused to give the part where the jury
would have been instructed that where a party is turning left and the traffic in one lane
stops to allow that person to turn left, that fact does not give such left-turning driver the
right to expect that other lanes will so yield nor remove such driver's duty to yield to traffic
in such other lanes.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS
THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE AUTOMOBILE
COLLISION WERE PERMANENT.
The principal issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs injuries from the
automobile collision were permanent or only temporary. Plaintiff believes this
determination is crucial for two reasons. First, if plaintiff s said injuries were permanent
than the jury award of $2,200 for general damages would appear to be inadequate and
13

given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or the evidence was insufficient to
justify such verdict; or the jury misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or their verdict was clearly against the weight of the
evidence. Second, even the small jury award of $2,200 was taken from plaintiff by the
court because the court found that plaintiffs said injuries were only temporary.
Plaintiff submits that the clear weight of the evidence is this case is that
plaintiffs injuries resulting from the automobile collision were permanent.
Plaintiff begins her consideration of this issue by marshaling all evidence in
the record which supports the conclusion that plaintiffs injuries were only temporary. This
is followed by plaintiffs discussion of that evidence. There follows then a summary of all
of the evidence tending to show that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile accident were
permanent. That summary is again followed by plaintiffs discussion of that evidence.
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A FINDING OF TEMPORARY
INJURY:
The only testimony that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile collision were
temporary came from Dr. Chung. In his written report admitted in evidence as Ex. C, Dr.
Chung concluded that the episode of 1-30-98, the episode of August 1998 and the
automobile collision of 9-18-98 were equally the cause of plaintiff s permanent injuries.
At the trial he does not repudiate that conclusion, but does quantify it by testifying that the
said three episodes in 1998 were each 30% responsible for plaintiffs injuries and that the
episode in May of 1999 was 10% responsible therefor. Dr. Chung goes on however to state
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for the first time his other "alterative" that the injuries from the automobile collision were
only temporary.
The record in that regard is set forth at pages Tr. 364: 233 - 237 on direct examination by
Mr. Burt:
Q Now Doctor, let me just get to the issue at hand. Have you formed an
opinion in this case about what treatment Mr.[sic!] Marshall received was
related to the motor vehicle accident?
A Yes.
Q And is that opinion based upon information that is reasonably relied upon
by experts in your field?
A I believe so, yes.
Q And can you state that opinion to a reasonable degree of medical
probability?
A Yes.
Q In other words, more likely than not standard.
A Yes.
Q And what is that opinion?
A My opinion is this. Ms. Marshall was fragile. She had pre-existing
myofascial tender points and trigger points effecting her spine from her
shoulder down to her low back, starting in January of 1998 and still requiring
treatment through September of 1998. This car accident did not help things.
It flared it up - flared up her symptoms. Looking through the medical records
where she received treatment, it appears that the treatment she received from
September 22nd of 1998 extending through December 17th of 1998 was
directly related to that car accident.
Q Okay, what about the treatment receive in 1999, 2000 and 2003, do you
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have an opinion about whether that treatment is related to the motor vehicle
accident?
A What I can tell you is that there's a four month break between December
17 th Mr. Madsen: AgainTHE WITNESS: There's a four month break between December 1998 and
resumption of care in April of 1999. Although it's possible that the treatment
after December of 1998 is related to that accident, I don't think it's likely.
Q Okay, why is that?
A Well, if you look at a nine month flow chart of Ms. Marshall's treatment,
even if the motor vehicle accident had not occurred, you would've been able
to expect that she would have periodic flares, flare ups of her pain, that
require treatment with or without injury. If you look at the treatment that Ms.
Marshall received in 2000, March of 2000 with Dr. Petron, October of 2000
with Dr. Petron, she didn't really have an injury. You know, she just had a
flare up of symptoms when she saw him. In May of 1999 she had a flare up
because of the type of work she does so even if this car accident never
happened, given that she's had nine months of symptoms from January of
1998 to September of 1998,1 think most physicians would have expected her
to have periodic flare ups and intermediate treatment regardless of this car
accident.
Q So as a result of the - and let me just make sure I understand that. As a
result of the injuries sustained earlier in 1998, those two prior injuries A Right.
Q You testimony is that it's more likely than not she would've had periodic
flare ups of those conditions with or without the motor vehicle accident.
A Yes. Now, it's my opinion that this motor vehicle didn't help things,
obviously.
Q Okay.
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A And that it probably flared up symptoms and required treatment. Now
there's two ways of looking at the glass that's half full, you look at it as half
empty or half full. You look at this car accident as being something that
flared up something temporarily and went back to baseline, or you could say
there's four accidents. Okay, three of those accidents appeared about equal.
The accident of January 30th, 1998, the accident at work in August of 1998,
the motor vehicle accident in September of 1998, and then those seem - those
accidents all required about the same amount of treatments and seemed to be
about as intense. The last accident of May 1999 seemed to be least intense
and required the least amount of treatment. So if you look at just the number
of injuries, you could say, alright, let's apportion 30 percent of the first
accident, 30 percent in second accident, and 30 percent the third accident, and
10 percent to the last accident, because there's four accidents, of which the
last accident is the last [sic!] significant. If you look at that, I think that's a
reasonable way to look at it. Or you could look at this motor vehicle accident
as one in a series of flare ups. Okay, that really didn't change anything longterm. Okay?
These are two reasonable ways of looking at it. There's no way to say which
version is right or wrong. Okay, it's just like looking at a glass half full or
half empty. So I think those are two basically reasonable ways of looking at
it, and I don't really have a strong preference one way or the other.
Q Okay, then just let me re-state. So your opinions are that you can look at
this on a continuum, and in that you could - you could look at the history of
1998 and say that she was going along and had treatment, then had pain, and
was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained an exacerbation of
that pre-existing condition, for which the care between September and
December would be related to the accident.
A Yes.

Q (BY MR. BURT) And the second alternative, Dr. Chung, would be that
you could look at the four events. Your opinion is that the first three events,
January 30th, August 14th, and September 18th of 1998, were all about the
same in terms of severity, and that fourth event in May, 1999, was probably
the least severe because it didn't require as much treatment at that time.
A Yes.
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Q So you would apportion it 30, 30, 30 and 10.
A Yes.
Tr. 364: 238 and 239 on direct examination by Mr. Burt:
Q Alright. Now Dr. Chung, have you formed any opinions in this case about
whether this patient needs future medical care related to the motor vehicle
accident:
A Yes.
Q And is that opinion, or are those opinions based upon a reasonable degree
of medical probability?
A Yes.
Q And there were based upon the type of information reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field"
A Yes.
Q Okay, what are those opinions?
A Well, first there's a difference between what's necessary and what's
reasonable Okay? Food and shelter is necessary. Okay, but it's reasonable to
have a little bit more than that. And so, is any more treatment necessary: NO.
But is getting a physical therapy visit and an occasional trigger point injection
reasonable? Yeah. Bottom line is that there's no cure for what Ms. Marshall
has besides encouraging her to exercise, to be as fit as possible, to understand
that when she experiences muscular pain of this sort that the best think is to
decrease activity and work through the symptoms rather than restrict activity.
Q So with regard to future medical care being related to the motor vehicle
accident, what is your opinion about whether she'll need care related to the
accident A I don't think further care is not -1 don't think further care is necessary. I
expect that Ms. Marshall will have periodic flare ups of pain, and if she wants
to go see a doctor and get some palliative treatment, I don't see anything
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wrong with that. Blaming it all on a motor vehicle accident that is just one of
four accidents, and blaming that treatment on a condition that most likely
would be exactly the same even if that accident had not occurred, to me
doesn't seem completely fair.
Tr. 364: 251 on cross-examination by Mr. Madsen:
Q And therefore, isn't it true that you try to get as - that you put your
maximum medical improvement - and if, in fact, you were the treating
physician, and said, I believe she was constantly recovering, constantly
improving May through September 16th, 1998, and but for the accident on the
18th, she would have recovered to MMI?
A I don't think that you could say that in a reasonable fashion.
Q You don't believe in the treating physician can make that kind of an
opinion?
A I believe -1 believe a treating physician can give any sort of opinion he
wants if he truly believes in it, but you look at her history over nine months,
and you look at her periodic flare ups, I don't think that you could say that if
it wasn't for this accident that Ms. Marshall would've been completely cured.
I believe you could say that Ms. Marshall does work that's strenuous, okay Q You're trying to convince the jury that she would've been essentially the
same today if there hadn't been a motor vehicle accident?
A Yes, I think I've made it clear Q That's what you're trying to say, that accident would just cause none of her
symptoms, none of the reason for Dr. Dall's treatment or for Dr. Patron's
treatment after September 19th, 1998, is that your testimony?
A If you'd let me answer, I Q Well, I (inaudible).
(Both talking)
A I believe there are two ways of looking at this. I believe that you can look
at four separate accidents, and you can portion the first group in 30, 30 ,30,
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and 10 to the last one, or I could look at this as a continuum of this accident
(inaudible) symptoms, worse than they should've been, and then going back
to baseline and being exactly the same as before. Either way is a reasonable
way of looking at it. There's no way to scientifically say one way of looking
at it is better than the other. That's what I'm trying to say.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that although the analogy is correct - that a glass
half-full is by definition also half-empty, that is not true of Dr. Chung's alternatives - they
are by no means equivalents.

In the first alternative, the auto collision was 30 %

responsible for a permanent, non-curable condition. The second is that the auto accident
only caused a temporary flare-up. How can those two alternatives be viewed as the same
thing? What Dr. Chung is saying is that the auto collision caused 30% of a permanent
condition or the auto collision only caused temporary injuries. In other words the result of
the auto collision was permanent injury or temporary injury. To say that an injury is
permanent or temporary is no opinion at all. Anyone off the street could say as much. To
say as Dr. Chung did that "There is no way to say which version is right or wrong" or that
"he has no preference" further neutralizes his "opinion."

At best Dr. Chung is saying he

doesn't know if it is permanent or temporary, and it is a matter of indifference to him. In all
events Dr. Chung's two alternatives are totally incompatible, and the result of his testimony
is that he has given no opinion with reasonable medical certainty nor an opinion which aids
the jury in their task. The jury knows coming into this case that the injuries are permanent
or temporary. They know no more after Dr. Chung's testimony.

His testimony does no

more than to leave them to speculate - in effect to flip a coin to see if plaintiffs injuries are
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permanent or temporary. This is no evidence upon which a jury or the court can make a
finding of temporary injury.
Dr. Chung never mentions this alternative theory in his written report (Ex. C).
Had he stated in his oral testimony that he had changed his mind and now felt that the auto
collision had only resulted in a temporary flare-up, that would be a medical opinion,
although perhaps a weak one. But to say that both views are equally valid is meaningless.
In fact in his medical report he seems to indicate just the opposite. At page 14 of the report
he says:
Given the chronicity of symptoms noted in the medical records prior to the
motor vehicle accident of 9-18-98, I believe it is likely that even if the
accident of 9-18-98 had never occurred the patient would still have sufficient
subjective symptoms involving her lumbosacral region to cause Ms. Marshall
to avoid certain strenuous physical activities. It is possible or perhaps even
probable that the accident of 9/18/98 caused the patient to have a permanent
increase in subjective symptoms. It would be impossible based upon the
current state of medical art to delineate to what degree the accident of 9-1898 increased the patient's probable preexisting symptoms well documented in
the medical records between 1-30-98 and 9-10-98. Based upon the current
available objective medical data, I believe it would be reasonable to assign
the responsibility of the patient's current subjective symptoms of pain and
discomfort which cause her to voluntarily restrict her physical activities
equally between the accidents of 1-30-98, August 1998 and 9-18-98. As
discussed previously in this report, I believe the accident that occurred in May
1999 was the least significant of the patient's four documented injury dates.
(Emphasis added.)
Although Dr. Chung states in his testimony at pages 238 and 239 that
plaintiffs condition would most likely have been the same without the accident, it should
be noted that when he made a similar statement at page 251 and was pressed on the point he
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immediately reverted to the alternative theories approach. Furthermore, the entire
testimony at pages 238 and 239 came in response to or as a follow-up to the question as to
whether any further treatment was necessary "related to the motor vehicle accident." His
answer was that further treatment was not necessary, but that such was reasonable, meaning
that further treatment resulting from the automobile collision was reasonable. We submit
that treatment which is "reasonable" is also "necessary" within the meaning of that term as
it applies to recoverable medical expenses. We therefore believe the testimony at pages
238 and 239 support plaintiffs position that the injuries from the automobile collision were
permanent rather that the opposite.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY:
The collision was severe. Plaintiff was traveling 40 mph (Tr. 363: 76), and
damage to her vehicle was about $2,000. (Tr. 363: 69) A summary of other evidence of
permanent injury resulting from the automobile collision is as follows:
RELEVANT PORTIONS OF MEDICAL REPORT OF DR. CHUNG DATED JUNE 23,
2003 (EX C):
Pages 12 - 14:
CAUSATION:
Ms. Marshall appears to personally believe that the entirety of her current
problems related to myofascial pain syndrome affecting her spine is a result
of the motor vehicle accident that occurred on 9-18-98. I would disagree
with Ms. Marshall's opinions regarding causation. According to the medical
records I have reviewed today, Ms. Marshall required medical treatment for
myofascial pain syndrome affecting her spine between 1-30-98 THROUGH
9-10-98. There is documentation of at least two separate episodes involving
the spine on 1-30-98 and in August 1998. I believe it would be extremely
unlikely between 9-10-98 and 9-18-98 that the patient would have a
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completed 100% resolution of symptoms.
Based upon the medical records I have reviewed, it appears that the flare up
caused by the motor vehicle accident of 9-18-98 was objectively as severe
and significant as the episodes documented in the medical records of 1-30-98
and August 1998. In May 1999, the patient had another aggravation of her
preexisting myofascial symptoms affecting her spine. The patient was seen
only once in follow up after this aggravation on 5/25/99 by Dr. Petron. Prior
instances of injury on 1/30-98 , August 1998 and 9-18-98 required more
treatment visits. The episode of 5/25/99 was the only date of injury where the
patient had just one treatment visit.
Starting on 3-2-00, the patient again complained of low back pain which was
worked up with benign plain films for the lumbar spine. No other dates of
injury are noted in the medical records between 3-2-00 and 11-9-00.
It is my opinion based un the medical records I reviewed today that the
accidents of 1-30-98, August 1998 and 9-18-98 were all equally significant.
It is my opinion that the accident documented in the report from Dr. Petron
on 5-25-99 was least significant. I am basing this opinion on the post injury
treatment records that indicate the patient required ongoing medical treatment
for myofascial pain syndrome affecting the spine.
PRIOR TREATMENT:
The patient appears to have been treated in a reasonable and appropriate
fashion by Dr. Petron and her prior physical therapist.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER TREATMENT:
It is highly unlikely that medical treatment of any sort will be curative for this
patient. Trigger point injections are likely to provide this patient with
temporary improvement in symptoms without changing her overall long-term
prognosis or ability to function. Ms. Marshall most likely achieved medical
stability following the accident of 9-18-98 on 12-17-98. I believe she reached
medical stability on 12-17-98, because the patient did not seek medical
treatment with Dr. Petron for close to four months between 12-17-98 and 414-99.
WORK/ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS:
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[The second paragraph of this section is relevant but is set forth in full at page
21 above and is not repeated here.]
FURTHER COMMENTS:
The opinions put forth above are based upon subjective information gained
frm the patient and objective information gained from review of the medical
records and physical examination. Further information may indeed change
the opinions put forth above.
Charges put forth in this evaluation are based upon two hours spent in
medical record review, twenty minutes spent in evaluation and discussion
with patient and forty-five minutes spend in medical documentation
preparation.
DR. CHUNG'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF 7/15/03 (Ex..C):
My sense is that she is dealing with an essentially lifelong condition at this
point given her lack of response.
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY:
Tr. 363: 86 and 87 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt:
Q Ms. Marshall, I just want to make sure I understand what your claims are.
Is it your contention that all of your current problems and symptoms are
related to injuries you sustained in the motor vehicle accident?
A I can't say whether they are. I know Fm in recent pain, I was doing fine
until the accident, and now Fm in constant pain where I don't sleep at night.
Q You're not sure whether -1 just want to make sure I understand, you're not
sure whether your current pain complaints all stemmed from the motor
vehicle accident, or whether some of them are a result of the two prior work
related incidents?
A I was doing fine before the accident. Since the accident Fm in more pain,
no sleep, muscle spasms, can't do the things I would like to do.
Q And you're attributing all of that to the motor vehicle accident, though?
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A I was felling fine before that. I was feeling pretty good. I was feeling
better than now. I was sleeping a little bit.
Q Alright, Mr. Marshall, forgive me, but I just want to understand. Are you
attributing all of that - all of those symptoms and all of those problems which
you're now having to the motor vehicle accident?
A Yes.
Q And it's our testimony that you were feeling fine before the motor vehicle
accident?
A Yes.
Tr. 363: 80 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen:
Q Where was your pain this time?
A Right where -1 hurt injured from my up - lower lumbar shoulder back
(inaudible) the shoulder blade there.
Q On the left side?
A Left side.
Q And how long did that continue?
A It's still continuing.
Tr.363: 85 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen:
Q Are there days when you're free of pain?
A. No.
Q Any day at all?
A No.
DR. PETRON'S TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL RECORDS:
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DR. PETRON'S TESTIMONY:
Tr. 363: 159-161 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen:
Q Now if, in fact, she had not had that injury - that motor vehicle accident,
what would your opinion have been as to her full recovery?
A I don't know if she would have full recovery, but it sounded like she was
doing well up until - up until she had the motor vehicle accident.
Q Now following that accident, and your continuing treatment, for a period,
as I would summarize your report, she appeared to be getting some
improvement. But then it became chronic or persistent and stayed thereafter.
Is that so?
A Right.
Q. For the rest of your treatment? And would those pains be consistent with
the kind of a motor vehicle accident that she described to you that happened
on the 19th of September, 1998?
A I didn't really describe the motor vehicle accident in my notes, so I can't
really say if the symptoms are consistent with the motor vehicle accident but
a motor vehicle accident could cause some of these symptoms.

Q but [sic!] for that accident, do you have an opinion as to whether she would
have otherwise recovered? You indicated earlier nearly so and I'm just
saying...
A Well, based on - on the record as I look back on 8/24/98, she was a
hundred percent better, and then she lifted a patient, she re-injured her back
lifting the patient, at that time it was thoracic back pain.
Q Then on the 10th?
A. Then on the 10th, she's still having some thoracic back pain Q But is improving (inaudible) five trigger points.
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A Correct.
Q Isn't there some language in that visit that again suggests continuing
improvement.
A Right. So she had - she had been 100% better up until the re-exacerbation,
and then continued improvement.
Tr. 363: 172 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt:
Q Okay. Thank you, Doctor.
Doctor, let me just ask you a couple of additional questions. The question
was asked, but for the accident of September of 1998, would she have gotten
better. And I sensed that you were somewhat hesitant to answer that
question.
A It's always hard to speculate if someone would be better. It seemed like
she was getting better, that in August she was a hundred percent better and
then had a re-exacerbation, and then on 9/10 she was still having some pain
but was improving. And so typically when somebody has myofascial pain
when there's - when there's not underlying problems, they tend to get better.
Q. Okay. And you can't say, then, whether those symptoms, the symptoms
she was having before the accident would have gone away without the
accident.
A I can't say with a hundred percent certainty, no.
Q You say that to a reasonable degree of medical probability that those
symptoms would have gone away.
A I would expect that they would've gone away, because typically
myofascial pain would go away.
Q So typically - what is myofascial pain?
A Just muscle pain, spasm.
Q Okay, and does is there anything (inaudible) - when you diagnose a patient
with myofascial pain, is there any kind of criteria for the duration of that pain
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that the patient must satisfy in order to meet that diagnosis?
A No.
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM DR. PETRON'S MEDICAL RECORDS
(Ex. 1 ):
8/24/98
Chief Complaint: Back pain.
History of Present Illness. Brenda was 100% better until she went on a call
last week and attempted to lift a patient and re-injured her back. She has had
some upper lumbar, lower thoracic back pain since that time. She denies any
numbness, tingling or change in bowel or bladder habits. She denies any
referred pain. She is mainly just feeling stiffness, decreased ROM and pain in
her lower thoracic spine.
9/10/98
Chief Complaint: Thoracic back pain.
History of Present Illness: Brenda has had a reexacerbation of some of her
thoracic back pain. I spoke to Lee in physical therapy today and he states that
she seems to be coming [sic!] quite dependant on physical therapy. He would
like to try to advance her to a home exercise program.
9/22/98
Chief Complaint: Thoracic back pain.
History of Present Illness: Brenda was doing well until she was in a MVA
and reinjured her back. She has had some increased pain again.
MEDICAL REPORT OF 9/23/98 OF PHYSICAL THERAPIST, TERESA HALL, TO
WHOM PLAINTIFF WAS REFERRED BY DR. PETRON (Page 17 of Ex. 1):
HISTORY: This patient is a 49-year-old female who was involved in a motor
vehicle accident on 9/19/98. She was driving when a car turned in front of
her, causing her to broadside another car. She denies hitting her head but is
complaining of pain across the chest and the front of her left groin from the
lap belt. The pain is aggravated with sitting more than 2-3 minutes and
prolonged standing or walking with a long stride. She feels better lying on her
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right side. She needs to take Flexeril in order to be able to sleep comfortably
through the night. The patient is a home health aide. She was on light duty for
work from a previous back injury and was released to return to full time when
she was involved in this motor vehicle accident. She has received physical
therapy at Red Butte Clinic from 12/97 until 7/15/98. Since her accident, the
patient has treated her symptoms by soaking in a hot tub. She currently rates
her pain at a 9/10. Her goal is to be able to return to full duty work, as soon as
possible.
Excepts from Letter of Dr. Petron to Robert C. Cummings of 10/22/01 (Ex.2, last page):
1) Brenda has primarily cervical and thoracic myofascial pain. Her symptoms
started after the accident, but it is difficult to put a degree of causation.
Typically these symptoms resolve spontaneously after a whiplash type injury
and it would be unusual to continue for such a prolonged period of time.
2) The treatment she has received under my care has included physical
therapy, trigger point injections, progressive strengthening and medication for
pain control.
3) Her progress has been fairly steady, but not complete relief of the pain and
she continues to be bothered with myofascial pain that I think will likely
persist.
4) She has not sustained any permanent disability as far as loss of range of
motion or any objective impairment or disfigurement that we can see on an
MRI or x-ray, but she continues to have the persistent myofascial pain.
5)1 think she is likely to need occasional trigger point injections, medications
and physical therapy from time to time to continue to treat this pain. I
don't anticipate Brenda needing any type of bracing or surgery or any other
invasive procedure. (Emphasis added.)
DR. DALL'S TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL RECORDS:
DR. DALL'S TESTIMONY:
Tr. 364: 187-189 on direct examination by Mr. Madsen:
Q. Thank you. Did you - you already indicated you have - you were
available, had readily available records of Dr. Petron and his treatments.
Then continue on as to what your sense was as to her (inaudible). The
conclusion of my sense, therefore, is in you report.
A You want me just to read that?
Q Would you, please?
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A My sense, therefore, is that she had a relatively straight forward myofascial
problem that had gone gently awry given consideration and her tendency to
avoid activity because of pain.
Q Now you say, gone gently awry, do you mean that's the normal the process
of deterioration, or how - what does that characterize in your mine [sic!]?
A Not terribly unusual for this type of problem, it had gone into chronicity. A
lot of people with this type of injury will have maintained symptoms for long
periods of time.
Q And is it consistent with an act that it was some four years before?
A Yes.
Q. Some - these kind of symptoms appear at a later date and become more
pronounced over time?
A I felt that the history she presented was very consistent with the type of
injury that she described.
Q What has been you experience with regard to long-term conditions
following injuries of this nature?
A My experience is that a person who has had a ceratin set of symptoms for
two years basically won't have much substantive change subsequent to that
time.
Q So do you have an opinion as to what her prognosis is, what the future
looks like for her?
A I feel that the past is the best predictor of the future in most cases like this,
and so I would expect that the foreseeable future will be very much like what
her last three or four years have been.
Q For a period of time, or for the rest of her life, or A For the foreseeable future. I don't see anything changing, so I guess we
could say for the rest of her life.
Tr. 364: 208 on cross-examination by Mr. Burt:
Q Okay. And you would agree with this statement, would you not, that in
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order for you to determine what the - let me rephrase it this way. If she is
going to need care in the future, one of the things that - if we're trying to
determine the cause of the need for that care in the future, which is one of the
questions in this case, you would agree that you have to look at all of her
injuries, would you not?
A Yes.
Q And all of those injuries would contribute to - all of those injuries would
contribute to this ongoing pain.
A Yes.
Q It's not just one isolated incident that would cause this patient in particular
to need care in the future, is it?
A If again we're speaking in general terms, that's correct. If we're speaking
in very specific terms, i.e. Ms. Marshall, I really don't have the records that I
need to make that kind of a statement.
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM MEDICAL RECORDS OF DR. DALL (Ex. 2 ):
3/25/03
Brenda Marshall presents today for evaluation of chronic low back pain. Shefs seen
Dr. Petron over the years though it's been three or four years since she last saw him.
She states that she first injured her back at work in about May 1998. She saw Dr.
Petron who did a series of trigger point injections. She seemed to be getting
better and then was involved in an auto accident in September 1998 which
exacerbated things. He continued to see her through 1999 at which point she was
discharged. Since then her insurance has changed so that she has not been able to
return to see him. Basically she's just been putting up with her symptoms. Initially
she states that due to an increased work load she's doing worse but when asked to
compare herself now to how she was when she was discharged by Dr. Petron,
she feels she's actually improved.
PHYSICAL EXAM:

The myofascial exam reveals diffuse tenderness to palpation extending
essentially from the mid-axillary line to the spinous processes and from the
inferior border of the scapula down to the mid-buttock almost in a perfect
rectangle. Her response to palpation within this area is dramatic (she's constantly
batting my hand away) and as soon as I move out of this area she has no other
tenderness. She is not tender to light touch and pressure applied with my palm is
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much better tolerated than with a fingertip.
IMPRESSION:
My sense therefore is that she has a relatively straightforward myofascial
problem that has gone gently awry given to it's duration and her tendency to
avoid activity because of pain.
TREATMENT PLAN:
All of the above is discussed with the patient at length and in detail. Our plan
will be get her going in physical therapy and I am referring her to Rick Lybbert
for this. She understands that just like her hypertension is managed with
antihypertensives, her myofascial pain is managed through exercise. It's not
what we do but what she does that will make the difference. It will not come
overnight but over weeks and months. I do not expect full resolution of
symptoms but would like to see some improvement. The good thing is that the
patient remains functional (working full-time) and is not using medications. I
will follow up with her in four weeks.
4/22/03
TREATMENT PLAN:
I recommend continued treatment for another four to six visits. By then we
should have achieved of goals of training the patient to be her own therapist.
I've indicated that given the duration of symptoms, and the type of work she
does, I don't expect her to be pain-free. Our goals are towards selfmanagement and maintained function. She understands the above. I'll see her
back in six weeks.
06/03/2003
IMPRESSION:
Widespread chronic- myofascial pain. While she was involved in a motor
vehicle accident five years ago, her complaints predate that. My sense is that
she is dealing with an essentially lifelong condition at this point given her lack
of response.
TREATMENT PLAN:
I think the best thing she can do for herself is to continue working on
activation and conditioning. If she can't tolerate lightweight exercises on
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land, perhaps she would do better in water. IVe recommended she look
into pool aerobics and have given her a handout with a number of pools
and resources. We'll see how she does with that.
I don't think I have anything to offer at this point and have not scheduled
followup.
Plaintiff believes that a careful consideration of the evidence in this action
demonstrates that the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiffs injuries from the
automobile collision were permanent. Both Dr. Petron and Dr. Dall concur that plaitniff s
condition is permanent. Dr. Chung's written report confirms this. Dr. Chung's oral
testimony to the extent it deviates therefrom does not constitute a credible opinion at all.
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
PROVE PERMANENT INJURIES BASED ON OBJECTIVE FINDINGS.
The lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action on the basis that plaintiff
had failed to meet the threshhold requirements of Section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) UCA. At the
oral argument on the motion for a new trial, it was noted that neither party had requested a
instruction specifically on the issue of whether plaintiff had sustained permanent injuries
based upon objective findings. It was further noted that Rule 49(a) URCP states that if in
giving its instructions to the jury:
"...If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings
or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may
make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a
finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict."
The lower court thereupon made the following findings (R. 348-350):
"1. The Court is convinced, based in part on the fact that the jury did not
award future special damages, that the jury accepted Dr. Jeffrey Chung's
opinion that the auto accident caused a temporary exacerbation of a preexisting condition which exacerbation resolved within a few months and
that on or about December 17, 1998 she had returned to her pre-auto
accident baseline condition. The Court Finds that the jury accepted the
first of Dr. Chung's options - that is she had a temporary exacerbation of
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a pre-existing condition and that the medical care related to that
exacerbation lasted from the date of the auto accident until approximately
December 17, 1998. This finding is consistent with the jury's verdict and
the greater weight of the evidence presented at trial.
"2. The auto accident did not cause a permanent impairment.
"3. There was no permanent impairment based upon objective findings. There is
no objective test for myofascial pain. The diagnosis of myofascial pain is based
entirely on the patient's self report of pain.
"4. The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs condition is permanent but is
also convinced that it is not permanent because of the auto accident. The
condition was permanent before the auto accident."
Thus the court not only accepted Dr. Chung's erroneous alternative theory of
temporary injury, which we have shown in Point 1 above to be against the weight of the
evidence, but further found that in any event there were no objective findings upon which a
diagnosis of permanent injury could ever be made with regard to myofascial pain, because
a diagnosis of "myofascial pain is based entirely on the patient's self report of pain."
Plaintiff contends that these findings are improper and in any event erroneous.
As to the impropriety thereof, the issue of liability was submitted to the jury
without any specificity as to permanent injury based upon objective findings. The parties
submitted the issue of liability to the jury in the form of Instructions No. 27 and 28, and by
special verdict form (all included in Addendum hereto) the jury was asked to determine if
defendant was negligent, and if that negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff s
injuries. The jury so found. (Fault apportioned to defendant was 90%.) Submitting the
issue of liability to the jury in that manner constituted a waiver of any requirement with
regard to a finding of permanent injury based upon objective findings. Also, failure to
move for a directed verdict normally precludes defendant from later claiming the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the verdict and the absence of such in this case should bar
defendant from claiming lack of permanent injury based upon objective findings.
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Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) Judge Quinn's findings improperly
infringe upon issues properly submitted to the jury.
In addition to the fact that the court's findings should not have been made in
the first place, the substance of the findings is also erroneous and against the clear weight
of the evidence. The lower court erred in finding that there is no objective test for
myofascial pain. It should be noted that the court did not find that there are objective tests
for myofascial pain, but plaintiff didn't prove such. The court has found that by definition,
neither plaintiff nor anyone else can prove such permanent injury by objective findings,
and accordingly the court did not have to canvass the testimony and medical reports to see
if proof existed. We believe the court was in error in this regard.
We respectfully submit that "objective findings" means nothing more than
that the disability or impairment be based upon what a physician determines from his own
physical examination. On the other hand subjective findings are those based upon what the
patient tells the physician apart from what the physician determines from his or her own
physical examination. This distinction appears to be of long standing. In the cases the
exact wording changes from time to time and from case to case. Sometimes the cases are
concerned with objective "symptoms" and sometimes with objective "findings," but the
aforesaid distinction appears to remain consistent in the cases. For example in the early
case of Dean v. Wabash R. Co..229 Mo. 425, 129 SW 953 (1910) the distinction is
explained in this manner:
"Objective symptoms are those which the surgeon discovers from a
physical examination of his patient; subjective symptoms are those he
learns from what his patient tells him. When a surgeon is called to serve
a patient who has received an injury, the full extent of which he is unable
to learn by his own sense of seeing, feeling or hearing, he puts questions
to the patient and learns from him what he can of the hidden injury; he
asks him what pains he feels or what other sensations he experiences, and
from those sources he forms his opinion on which he prescribes for his
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patient. A surgeon is not always bound to take as truth what his patent
tells him, because sometimes the facts which his own physical
examination has shown may in his mind prove that the patient's statement
is incorrect, sometimes he may shrewdly detect a willful suppression or
misrepresentation, sometimes a delusion. But when he has no cause to
suspect untruth or delusion he takes what his patient says, and weighs the
subjective symptoms with those he discovered, and on them he bases his
diagnosis and proceeds to his prescription."
Case law makes it clear that objective findings are not limited to what can be
seen or ascertained by touch. As state in Van Vleet v. York Public Serv. Co., I l l Nebr.
51,53, 195 NW 467
(1923):
"Defendant's idea is that by objective symptoms are meant symptoms of
an injury which can be seen or ascertained by touch. We are of the
opinion that the expression has a wider meaning, and that symptoms of
pain, and anguish, such as weakness, pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions
of pain clearly involuntary, or any other symptoms indicating a
deleterious change in the bodily condition may constitute objective
symptoms as required by the statute."
Franz v. Schroeder. 184 La 945, 168 So. 110 (1936) was a worker's
compensation case. In that case the court held at page 110:
"In 46 Corpus Juris, p. 846, 'objective symptoms' is defined as follows:
'In medicine, those which a physician, by ordinary use of his senses,
discovers from a physical examination.1 And in a footnote thereunder,
under the caption, 'Not limited to symptoms ascertainable by touch,'
citing Van Vleet v. Public Service Co. of York, 111 Neb. 51, 53, 195
N.W.467, 468..."
If anything, it appears that the meaning of "objective findings" has been
expanded and become more Jiberal over time. In a recent worker's compensation case in
Oregon, SAIF v. Lewis, 58 P3d 814 (2002), the Supreme Court of Oregon in overruling a
more restrictive opinion of the Court of Appeals of Oregon noted at page 818 of the
Supreme Court opinion that the Oregon statute provided that:
"Such objective findings include either physical findings or subjective
responses to physical examinations that are 'reproducible, measurable or
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observable."
The court went on to hold at page 819:
"An essential characteristic of the definition in ORS 656.005(19) is
that it does not constrain the person who identifies an indication of injury
or disease to rely solely on his or her own perceptions or examinations.
Medical personnel act in accordance with ORS 656.005(19) by
employing the range of diagnostic methods that their professions
prescribe, including such techniques as consulting with nurses,
technicians, therapists, and other health care professionals; examining the
patient's medical records; reviewing the reports of witnesses,
investigators, and police officers; and interviewing the patient, family
members, friends, coworkers, and others who might have information that
pertains to an indication of injury or disease. Information gleaned from
such sources may be sufficient to establish that a claimant had or has an
indication of injury or disease. If so, then the board properly may
characterize that indication as 'verifiable.'
"We have discovered no other contextual sources that shed any
further or different light on the meaning of'objective findings' in ORS
656.005(19). In our view, the meaning of that statutory definition is clear
and arises from the ordinary meaning of the terms that the legislature used
in enacting that statute."
No Utah case has been found defining "objective findings." In McNair v.
Farris, 944 P2d 392 (UtApp 1997) the Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the matter from
the standpoint of what did not constitute objective findings, but did not really spell out
affirmatively what the term meant. In McNair, our Court of Appeals held that statements
in plaintiffs deposition are not sufficient to meet the requirements of objective findings.
The court stated at page 395:
"The express language of section 31 A-22-309(l)(a) requires that any
permanent disability or impairment be based on objective findings.
McNair thus has the burden of demonstrating the permanency of his
injury with something more than his say so."
The court makes clear in McNair that testimony of a physician is required, but gives no
indication that Utah would in any way depart from what appears to be the general rule as
stated above that objective findings are those arrived at by the physician from his
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examination of the patient and not based solely on the subjective statements of that patient.
This conclusion seems to be borne out by the definition of the term "objective
medical impairment" as used in the Public Employees Long Term Disability Act found at
49-21-401 et seq. UCA. Subsection (6) thereof states:
"'Objective medical impairment1 means an impairment resulting from an
injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on
accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective
complaints."
It is therefore clear that such things as pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions of
pain clearly involuntary, muscle spasms and other like conditions discernable to the
physician independent of the statements of the patient constitute objective findings.
In this action the findings of the experts were all based upon physical
examination and other tests performed by them. Their opinions were not based solely upon
what plaintiff told them.
The records contain ample references to the actual examinations and tests
performed by the physicians. For example, Dr. Dall's record of March 25, 2003 (Plaintiffs
Exhibit 2) states in relevant part:
"The myofascial exam reveals diffuse tenderness to palpation extending
essentially from the mid-axillary line to the spinous processes and from
the inferior border of the scapula down to the mid-buttock almost in a
perfect rectangle. Her response to palpation within this area is dramatic
(she's constantly batting my hand away) and as soon as I move our of this
area she has no other tenderness. She is not tender to light touch and
pressure applied with my palm is much better tolerated than with a
fingertip." (Emphasis added.)
That clearly meets the test referred to above of "symptoms of pain, and anguish, such as
weakness, pallor, sickness, nausea, expressions of pain clearly involuntary..." (Emphasis
added.)
There are numerous references to the medical records in evidence in this
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action which constitute "objective findings." A few such were furnished the lower court
as Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing No Cause Judgment ( R. 299 and
300) and those pages are included in Addendum hereto.
The lower court was perhaps led into the foregoing error by the testimony of
Dr. Chung as elicited by defendant's counsel. Dr. Chung testified as to the meaning of
"objective" and "subjective" at some length. Dr. Chung testified that any finding that is in
any way dependent upon the statements or actions of a patient is subjective. He admitted
that physicians often base their diagnosis on what a patient says, but still insisted that
anything which can be influenced by a patient is subjective.
For example, Dr. Chung stated at Tr. 364: 245:
"A You know, physicians typically, you know, have a reason for
distinguishing between words, and the words subjective and objective are
very important. Subjective means that it's a complaint that can be
influenced by a patient consciously. OK, an objective finding is
something that cannot be influenced by a patient. Ms. Marshall's
complaints are entirely subjective. That doesn't mean they - they don't
exist, but it can't be conformed or proved by a test, like x-ray or MRI
scan.
Q I just want to be clear here. There, according to your review of these
medical records, there was nothing objective go [sic!] demonstrate that
she in fact was injured. You don't dispute that she was.
A Right. Right, you know, there are a lot of diseases like myofascial pain
syndrome that cannot be objectified. You can't do a test that shows it
exists or not. I see no reason not to believe Ms. Marshall when she says
she hurts, or that these areas are tender, or you know, that she saw the
doctors that she say and said what she said.
But you have to also understand that objective things help because it
takes away any uncertainly. A broken bone is a broken bone is a broken
bone, and it show up on an x-ray. Now there are some things that you can
see on x-ray that are subjective findings. For example, loss of cervical
lordosis means that the neck is straight. Okay, right now I've lost the
cervical lordosis, and we say that on x-ray, but radiologists say loss of
cervical lordosis. Well, obviously the position of your neck is something
that you can control. That's a subjective finding. A broken bone, a torn
ligament, or gap in your bones that cannot be consciously influenced is an
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objective finding."
That may be Dr. Chung's understanding of subjective and objective, but it is
for the court to declare the law and not Dr. Chung, and although the court seems to have
accepted Dr. Chung's view, plaintiff believes that it is erroneous view, and that in adopting
it the lower court judge has committed prejudicial error in law. The correct view we
believe is expressed in the authorities set out above and that procedures which physicians
regularly use in reaching a diagnosis (including statements by the patient) should be held to
be objective withing the meaning of Section 30A-22-309(l)(a)(iii). I n the last analysis,
even Dr. Chung seems to be in accord with this view in formulating his own opinions
because he states at page 14 of his report of 6/23/03 (Ex. C):
"The opinions put forth above are based upon subjective information
gained from the patient and objective information gained from review of
the medical records and physical examination../'
This is the way physicians conduct their business, and we do not think the legislature
intended (nor is it proper for the lower court) to impose a new or different standard.
Without conceding the larger point, we note out of prudence, that since
plaintiff established the permanent nature of her injuries by objective findings, in all events
the small verdict she received should not have been taken from her as the court did,
although it should have been set aside and a new trial granted which we discuss in the next
point.
POINT 3 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
GENERAL DAMAGES.
Rule 59(a) URCP provides in relevant part:
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any
of the following causes...:
"(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
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under the influence of passion or prejudice."
"(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law."
Plaitniff submits that the only credible evidence in this action is that
plaintiffs injuries were severe and permanent, and the jury's award of the miserly sum of
$2200 for general damages was clearly inadequate and appears to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice, or under a misunderstanding of the facts and law in
this case, or against the clear weight of the evidence. Nevertheless the lower court denied
plaintiffs motion for a new trial. This was error.
To the extent denial of said motion for a new trial is based upon the lower
courf s erroneous concept of the meaning of permanent injuries based upon "objective
findings," the lower court's action should be reviewed for correctness. Clearly Judge
Quinn's erroneous view of the law was determinative of or at least greatly influenced his
decision not to grant a new trial, and because of that error in law, a new trial should have
been granted pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) URCP.
It also clearly appears that Judge Quinn was influenced in his decision not to grant
a new trial because he thought the jury had accepted Dr. Chung's alternative "temporary"
injury theory, which he himself felt was supported by the "greater weight of the evidence"
(Finding No. 1). If as plaintiff contends Dr. Chung's alternative theory of temporary
injury is erroneous (plaintiffs Point 1 in this brief), then it seems clear that Judge Quinn
was in error in not granting a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was clearly based
upon insufficient evidence, upon a proposition clearly against the weight of the evidence.
If the lower court's denial of motion for new trial is not viewed as an error of law,
then such action in denying said motion for a new trial is reviewed on appeal as held in
Crookston, supra, to determine if there is a reasonable basis for the decision. The court in
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that case held at page 805:
In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny a new trial, we
will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.
In order however to determine that question, it is necessary to bear in mind the available
parameters of the lower court's discretion, and we therefore review some of the Utah cases
on the granting of motions for new trial.
There is ample support in Utah case law for the granting of a new trial based upon
inadequate damages.
In Saltas v. Affleck, supra, the plaintiffs son was killed in an automobile
collision. The decedent had a life expectancy of 35 years and 3 months. The jury awarded
plaintiff $800. The trial court required defendant to agree to a judgment of $2,400,
otherwise a new trial would be granted. Defendant refused the additur. The new trial
resulted in a judgment for plaintiff of $3,061. The granting of the new trial was upheld on
appeal. The Utah statute on new trials because of passion and prejudice at the time of the
Saltas case was in essence the same as it is now, although worded somewhat differently
(See Sec. 104-40-7 R. S. Utah 1933). Our Supreme Court held at page 178:
"However, if inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict presents a
situation that such inadequacy or excessiveness shows a disregard by the
jury of the evidence or the instructions of the court as to the law
applicable to the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered
under such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or instructions
or under the influence of passion or prejudice then the court may exercise
its discretion in the interest of justice and grant a new trial."
The court went on to state also on page 178:
"We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting a motion for a
new trial. It may be there was sufficient in the record of the former trial to
justify the trial court in concluding the jury had disregarded or
misconceived the instructions given or the evidence. Damages in the sum
of $800 may have seemed sufficiently inadequate as to cause the court to
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think the verdict was the result of bias or prejudice. Whether such bias or
prejudice existed we have no means of determining except from the
amount of the verdict."
In this case the jury requested further instruction on the meaning of the
various categories of damages (Tr. 364: 306-7). It appears clear that they did not
understand the instructions on damages. In any event they certainly did not follow them,
and did not award reasonable damages. The jury did not award an amount that any
reasonable person could claim was sufficient for a lifetime of pain and suffering, nor even
30% of such an amount.
Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra, was a case decided by our Supreme Court a
little earlier the same year as Saltas. In Chatelain, the jury had awarded special damages to
plaintiff of $274.87, general damages to plaintiff of $100 and damages for the death of
plaintiff wife of $1,000. The trial court held the award inadequate and granted a new trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed and noted that the deceased wife's life expectancy was 42.87
years, she was in good health and assisted plaintiff in his work for which she was paid.
The court held at page 198:
"However, when the amount assessed by a jury bears no proper relation to
the wrong suffered as shown by the evidence and in accordance with the
instructions of the court, then a proper case is presented for the exercise
by the court of its power to set aside verdicts. In this case the age of the
decedent, the condition of her health, her expectancy of life, and the
services rendered by her, render the award of $1,000 made by the jury to
the plaintiff for her loss palpably inadequate, and indicates that the jury
either disregarded or misconceived the evidence , or the courtfs
instructions."
The same is true in this case. The leading case in recent years on the subject of the
granting of new trials appears to be Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, where our
Supreme Court held at page 804:
"The reason that any determination as to whether the jury exceeded its
proper bounds is best made in the first instance by the trial court is that
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the trial judge is present during all aspects of the trial and listens to and
views all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best determine if the jury
has acted with 'passion or prejudice1 and whether the award was too small
or too large in light of the evidence. The trial judge is free to grant or
deny a motion for a new trial if it is reasonable to conclude that the jury
erred....
"Thus, in passing on a motion for a new trial, if the trial court cannot
reasonable find that the jury erred, it should deny the motion. On the
other hand, if the trial court can reasonably conclude that there was
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or it is manifestly against the
weight of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6) or that the jury acted
with passion or prejudice contrary to rule 59(a)(5), it may grant the
motion and order a new trial."
Other like cases are as follows: Stack v. Kearns. 118 Utah 237, 221 P2d 594 (1950);
Braithwaite v. West Valley City, 921 P.2d 997 (Utah 1996); Bodon v. Suhrman, 8 Utah 2d
42, 327 P2d 826 (1958); and Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P2d 701 (Utah
1961). [Wellman was overruled by Randle v. Allen. 862 P2d 1329 (Utah 1993) to the
extent it approved the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident.]
In this case the clear weight of the evidence is that plaintiff has severe and
permanent injuries resulting in constant pain. No reasonable person would conclude that
such a condition merits only $2,200 in general damages. There does not appear to be any
reasonable basis for the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial, where that court is
operating an erroneous concept of the as to objective findings, under an equally erroneous
concept of the validity of Dr. Chung's alternative theory, and given the clear inadequacy of
$2,200 damages for severe and permanent injuries.
POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE
SPECIAL DAMAGES.
The uncontradicted evidence in this action was that plaintiff sustained special
damages for medical care after the automobile collision of $6,305.37. There was no
evidence to the contrary. The bills and summaries thereof ( Exhibits 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10)
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were admitted in evidence on stipulation, and the parties are bound by the recitals therein.
The jury only awarded special damages of $2,100 and in so doing it is clear that they acted
with passion or prejudice, or that they "misapplied or failed to take into account proved
facts, or misunderstood or disregarded the law or made findings clearly against the weight
of the evidence."
Also, the jury failed to award any damages for future specials,
notwithstanding Dr. Dall testified that plaintiffs future specials from the automobile
collision would probably be substantially the same as she had incurred theretofore. There
was no evidence to the contrary. The awarding of no amount for future specials is a further
indication that the jury acted with passion or prejudice, or that they "misapplied or failed to
take into account proved facts, or misunderstood or disregarded the law or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence." The conclusion is borne out by the fact that
the jury after deliberating for a considerable time, requested further instructions on the
definitions of the various kinds of damages.
The medical bills having been admitted into evidence by stipulation of the
parties without limitation were therefore admitted for all purposes. In 75 Am Jur 2d Trials,
Section 417 it states in relevant part:
"Where a party does not request an instruction limiting the evidence to a
specific purpose, even though such evidence is otherwise inadmissible,
that party waives any complaint to the general admission of the
evidence."
The uncontradicted and only evidence before the jury was that the medical
expenses of plaintiff subsequent to the automobile collision amounted to $6,305.37.
There was no basis in the evidence for the jury to apportion any part of the
medical bills incurred after the automobile accident to any other incident, nor was there
any instruction authorizing such apportionment. There is absolutely nothing in the
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evidence to justify the jury in saying a particular bill incurred after the automobile collision
is attributable to lifting incident No. 1 and should thus be excluded, or that such a bill is
attributable to lifting incident No. 2 and should thus be excluded. In Tingey v.
Christensen, 987 P 2d 588 (Utah 1999) our Supreme Court adopted as the rule of law in
Utah that where no reasonable basis exists for apportioning special damages between a
preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, the tortfeasor is responsible for all damages.
The court held at page 592:
"We hold that if the jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning
damages between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should
do so; however, if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it
should find that the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages."
Tingey involved failure of the lower court to give a requested instruction covering that
point of law. Although in this case no such instruction was requested, plaintiff believes
that the court can and should find as a matter of law that no reasonable basis for
apportionment exists in the present case and that therefore the principle applies.
It is true that Dr. Chung testified that plaintiffs condition was only 30%
caused by the automobile collision. Even if the jury accepted that view, it does not follow
that the medical expenses incurred after the automobile accident are only 30% chargeable
to the automobile collision. Dr. Chung himself said that all of the expenses from the date
of the accident to basically to the end of the year of 1998 were the result of the automobile
collision. This involves $680 of Dr. Petron's bills and University of Utah Physical
Therapy bills of $591 and $661 for a total of $1,932.00. The remaining bills from
plaintiffs Exhibit 10 amount to $4,196.30 (balance of Dr. Petron of $405, Dr. Dall's bill of
$332 and Mountainlands Physical Therapy bill of $3,459.30). Adding the said $1,932 plus
even 30% of $4,196.30 ($1,258.89) equals $3,190.89. (Plaintiff s Exhibits 4 , 5 , 7 , 9 and
10)
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Finally, the total bills incurred after the collision of September 19, 1998,
were admittedly $6,305.37. Even if plaintiff s permanent injuries were caused in a
30/30/30/10 percent manner (30% caused by the automobile collision) which is the best
light that can be placed upon Dr. Chung's testimony, it does not follow that special
damages incurred for medical care are only 30% attributable to the auto collision. If, for
example, plaintiffs condition requires a one hour consultation, examination and treatment
with her physician, there is no evidence that the auto collision is only responsible for 30%
of 60 minutes, or in other words for 18 minutes. The entire hour of consultation,
examination and treatment is necessitated by her total condition, which is one condition
and not four conditions. The entire expenditure was necessary for the treatment of each
and every part of the plaintiffs total condition. The same is true of medication. Can we
say that 30% of a pill is all plaintiff is entitled to because of the automobile collision? If
she needs a pill she needs the whole pill not just 30% of it. This is not a case where 30%
of the dollars went to the automobile accident injuries as a distinguishable condition.
Every dollar went to the treatment of one condition, and that total condition would not have
existed but for the automobile collision, and said collision is a substantial and inseparable
part of that one condition, and the total amount of the specials should be counted toward
meeting the threshold, and are recoverable in this action.
POINT 5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 11.
A. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 RELATING TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY.
The trial court erred in failing to give plaintiffs requested instruction No. 16
( R. 134) informing the jury that plaintiffs probable life expectancy (based upon mortality
table) was 25.3 years. (Plaintiffs Requested Instructions Nos. 16, 15 and 11 included in
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the Addendum hereto.)
Rule 59(a)(7) provides for "Error in law" as the other relevant ground for a
new trial under the facts of this case. It was error in law to fail to give the Plaintiffs
Requested Instruction No. 16. Had this instruction been given the jury would have had a
before it the probable duration (25.3 years) of plaintiff s suffering from the established
severe and permanent injuries.

This instruction would likely have resulted in a

substantially larger verdict, and one which could be said to "fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiff." Failure to give this instruction was prejudicial error. Rule
201(d) Utah Rules of Evidence provides with respect to judicial notice:
"When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information."
Utah Trial Handbook, 1994, David W. Schofield states in relevant part at p. 168:
"Courts generally take judicial notice of the existence of standard
mortality, or life expectancy, tables which seek to approximate the life
span of men and women from past experience. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence
Section 113."
The applicable mortality table was furnished to the court from a reliable and
accepted source, to-wit: Am Jur 2nd Desk Book. Certainly the requirements for judicial
notice were met, and the this requested instruction should have been given, and failure to
give it was prejudicial error..
B. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 RELATING TO
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING INJURY.
The lower court erred in failing to give plaintiffs requested instruction No.
15 ( R. 133). Said instruction was MUJI Instruction No. 27.7 rather than or together with
MUJI Instruction No. 27.6 which was given.
Plaintiff requested that the instruction found at MUJI No.27.7 be given instead of
or at least along with the instruction found at MUJI No. 27.6 which was given. (Copy of
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MUJI 27.7 and MUJI 27.6 are included in the Addendum hereto.)
It was plaintiffs theory of the case that she had substantially recovered from any
prior injuries. Plaintiff testified for example at Tr. 363: 86:
Q And it's your testimony that you were feeling fine before the motor
vehicle accident?
A Yes.
Plaintiff testified at Tr. 363: 74 that she had been released by Dr. Petron to go back to work
two days before the accident and she testified that she was feeling fine at that time. At Tr.
363: 162 in response to Mr. Madsen's question: "I just - a final question being, did you
intend her to go back to full work activity as of that report [9/10/98]; is that correct? The
last sentence? Advance hr to full duty shortly?" Dr. Petron answered: "Correct." That
fact is also recorded in the records of Teresa Hall, physical therapist to whom plaintiff was
referred by Dr. Petron who stated in her report of 9/23/98: "She was on light duty for work
from a previous back injury and was released to return to full time when she was involved
in this motor vehicle accident."

Dr. Petron in his report of 9/22/98 said that "Brenda was

doing well until she was in a MVA and reinjured her back. She has had some increased
pain again." Furthermore, Dr. Petron testified that but for the accident she would have
fully recovered. Both Dr. Dall and Dr. Petron testified that plaintiffs condition was
consistent with and flowed from the injuries sustained in the automobile collision. It was
thus plaintiffs theory that the automobile collision lighted-up her prior condition from
which she had substantially recovered, and there was ample evidence to support plaintiffs
theory, and plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed on her theory. This instruction
is based on Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P2d 80 (Ut App 1987) which held at page 88:
'The rule is well settled that when a defendant's negligence aggravates or
lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one to which
the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the injured
49

person for the full amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding such
diseased or weakened condition. In other words, when a latent condition
itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus an injury brings on pain
by aggravating the pre-existing condition, then the injury, not the dormant
condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. A plaintiff,
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually and
necessarily follow the injury."
Failure to give Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 15 was prejudicial error
C. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 RELATING
TO LEFT TURNS IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC.
Plaintiff Requested Instruction No. 11 ( R. 129) instructs the jury that a car
stopping in one lane to allow a left turn by defendant does not give right to defendant to
expect other lanes to stop nor remove defendant's duty to yield to traffic in such other
lanes. Although the court gave the first paragraph of this requested instruction, it refused
to give the second paragraph. Said refused paragraph is in accord with the law (see Section
41-6-73 UCA cited on page 4 of this brief), and should have been given. The evidence of
any negligence on the part of plaintiff is really non-existent. This instruction would have
been of substantial help to plaintiff, and failure to give it was prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, or to an additur
awarding her $6,305.37 in special damages, a reasonable amount for future damages and a
reasonable amount of general damages and costs. In all events plaintiff is entitled to
judgment upon the verdict of the jury, together with costs.
Dated this *2 £~day of October, 2004.

GORDON A. MADSEN
~7^
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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Mailed two copies of the within brief including addendum to Bruce C. Burt,
attorney for defendant and appellee, at his address, 215 So. State, Suite 500, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this 7 > day of October, 2004.

ADDENDUM
Document No.
VERDICT

1

JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

2

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

3.

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 15 AND 1 1 . . . .4
MUJI 27.6 AND 27.7

5

COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 27 AND 28

6

APPENDIX 1 FROM PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING
NO CAUSE OF ACTION JUDGMENT WITH SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
OF OBJECTIVE FINDINGS IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRENDA J. MARSHALL,
VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 020908282
O. STEWART PIERCE,
Judge:

Defendant.

Anthony B. Quinn

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of
the issue presented, answer **Yes.'' If you find the evidence is so
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer **No." Also, any damages assessed must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was

the

defendant,

0.

Stewart

Pierce,

negligent

as

alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

yC

Was defendant's

No
negligence

a proximate

cause

of

the

injuries sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

No

Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by

the defendant?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes

A

No

Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of the

9a^

plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes

yC

No
xx

If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4

Yes,''

then, and only then, answer the following question: Assuming all
the negligence that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries to
total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Plaintiff,

1 o

B.

Defendant,

^°

%
%

TOTAL

100%

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 **Yes,7/ state the
amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If
such questions were not answered

x

*Yes,'' do not answer this

question.
Special Damages:
A. Past Special Damages

$_2MJ_Oo_1_<^o

B. Future Special Damages

$

0

General Damages:
$ ~Ls7JQc> » o O

TOTAL

$ 4 i ^ O - °Q

day of January, 2004,

Foreperson

yx\

DOCUMENT 2

MLEB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 0 9 2004
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

BRUCE C. BURT, USB NO. 8453
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
215 South State Street, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA J. MARSHALL,
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff,
vs.

O. STEWART PIERCE,

Civil No. 020908282
Judge Anthony Quinn

Defendant.

On January 7 and 8, 2004 the above entitled matter was tried to a jury. The jury received
evidence and, on January 8, 2004, returned a verdict. The jury returned the following verdict:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Was the Defendant, O. Stewart Pierce, negligent as alleged by Plaintiff? Yes.
Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff? Yes.
Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by the defendant? Yes.
Was the plaintiffs negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries? Yes.
If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4 'Yes,' then, and only then, answer the
following question: Assuming all the negligence that proximately caused the
plaintiffs injuries to total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable
to:
A.
Plaintiff, 10%
B.
Defendant, 90%
If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 'Yes,', state the amount of special and

general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries
complained of. If such questions were not answered 'yes,' do not answer this question.
Special Damages:
A.

Past Special Damages

$2,100.00

B.

Future Special Damages

$0

General Damages
Total:

$2,200.00
$4,300.00

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff failed to meet the threshold
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) and, therefore, the Court hereby enters a
Judgment of No Cause of Action against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant, O. Stewart Pierce. The
Court further orders that Defendant has no obligation to pay Plaintiff any of the damages awarded
and that the matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice
DATED this J_ day of -feuiuary, 2004.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ff day of January, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document, postage prepaid to:
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Robert C. Cummings
Gorgon Madson
225 South 200 E., Ste. 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

y ^ U p g ^ . BURT

DOCUMENT 3

FILIO ©SSTHfe? COURT
Third Judicial District
BRUCE C. BURT, USB NO. 8453
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
215 South State Street, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

APR 2 7 2004
By

SALT LAKE COUj
_ _
Deputy Clerk"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA J. MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,

]
)
;)

vs.

]

0. STEWART PIERCE,

]1
1
)

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Civil No. 020908282
Judge Anthony Quinn

Following the jury verdict that was rendered on January 8,2004 Defendant filed a Motion for
Entry of Judgment and asked the Court to enter a judgment of "no cause of action" against Plaintiff.
That motion was fully briefed and the Court signed the Judgment of No Cause of Action on February
9,2004. At about the same time the Motion for Entry of Judgment was filed, Plaintiffs counsel filed
a separate Motion for New Trial. The Motion for New Trial was fully briefed by both parties and oral
argument was held on March 23, 2004. Having considered all trial testimony and evidence, the
memoranda, arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing the Court hereby enters the
following ORDER:

1.

Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial is denied. The jury verdict was well supported by the

evidence. There is no basis for a finding of passion or prejudice.
The Court hereby enters the following findings pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
1.

The Court is convinced, based in part on the fact that the jury did not award future

special damages, that the jury accepted Dr. Jeffrey Chung's opinion that the auto accident caused a
temporary exacerbation of a pre-existing condition which exacerbation resolved within a few months
and that on or about December 17,1998 she had returned to her pre-auto accident baseline condition.
The Court finds that the jury accepted the first of Dr. Chung's options - that is she had a temporary
exacerbation of a pre-existing condition and that the medical care related to that exacerbation lasted
from the date of the auto accident until approximately December 17,1998. This finding is consistent
with the jury's verdict and the greater weight of the evidence presented at trial.
2.

The auto accident did not cause a permanent impairment.

3.

There was no permanent impairment based upon objective findings. There is no

objective test for myofascial pain. The diagnosis of myofascial pain is based entirely on the patient's
self report of pain.
4.

The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs condition is permanent but is also convinced

that it is not permanent because of the auto accident. The condition was permanent before the auto
accident.

2

/

th

DATED this ^ / d a y of April, 2004

3
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GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
225 South

MADSEN, #2048 ;. , ...-../,
CUMMINGS, #777
for the Plair}tiff.': f; j
200 East, #150
IN THE THIRD^J^ro^jQIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA J. MARSHALL,
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
AND PROPOSED VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020908282
O. STEWART PIERCE,
Judge:

Defendant.

Anthony B. Quinn

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the following Jury
Instructions, Numbered 1 to
the trial of this action.

f(#

, both inclusive, be given at

Plaintiff's requested jury Verdict form

is also submitted herewith.
Dated this -2, (

day of December, 2003.

rl^L/W^
GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

y

Copy of the foregoing delivered to Bruce C. Burt at his
address, 215 So. State, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
*3 / day of December, 2003.

dj a

Attorney for Plaintiff

INSTRUCTION NO.

/t

The driver of a vehicle turning left must yield to
vehicles close enough to represent an immediate hazard.

However,

a driver is not compelled to remain in an intersection indefinitely
waiting to turn. The driver must make reasonable observations and
yield when reasonably necessary.
When a driver is turning left across more than one lane
of oncoming traffic and another driver in one lane of such oncoming
traffic stops to allow such left-turning driver to proceed, this
does not give such left-turning driver the right to assume that
drivers in the remaining oncoming lanes will also stop and yield
their right-of-way, and does not relieve such left-turning driver
of the duty to make reasonable observations and yield in such other
oncoming lanes when reasonably necessary.
1st paragraph MUJI 5.17

r
INSTRUCTION NO.

* ^

A person who has a latent, dormant or asymptomatic
condition, or a condition to which the person is predisposed, may
recover the full amount of damages that proximately result from
injuries that aggravate the condition. In other words, when a
latent condition does not cause pain, but that condition plus the
injury brings on pain by aggravating the preexisting, dormant or
asymptomatic condition, then it is the injury, not the dormant or
asymptomatic condition, that is the proximate cause of pain and
disability.
MUJI 27.7

INSTRUCTION NO.

*&

According to the mortality tables, the expectancy of life
of a black female aged 54 years is 25.3 years.
This fact, which is now in evidence, is to be considered
by you in arriving at the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff.
Life expectancy shown by the mortality tables is merely
an estimate of the probable average remaining length of life of all
persons in our country of a given age. The inference that may be
drawn from the tables applies only to one who has the average
health and exposure to danger of people of that age. Thus, in
connection with this evidence, you should consider all other
evidence bearing on the same issue, such as that pertaining to the
occupation, health, habits and activities of the person whose life
expectancy is in question.
MUJI 27.12

DOCUMENT 5

DAMAGES

27.6

MUJI 27.6
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS
(Alternate A)
A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an
injury is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or
disability. However, the injured person is entitled to recover
damages for any aggravation of such preexisting condition or
disability proximately resulting from the injury.
This is true even if the person's condition or disability made the
injured person more susceptible to the possibility of ill-effects than
a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally
healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial
injury.
When a preexisting condition or disability is aggravated,
damages for the condition or disability are limited to the
additional injury caused by the aggravation.
Comments
Alternate Instruction A reflects the holding of the Utah Supreme Court
in Branson v. Strong, (cited below). The Court did not specifically address
the issue of dormant and asymptomatic conditions. Alternate Instruction B
reflects the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals in Biswell v. Duncan (cited
below), where the plaintiff claimed that the preexisting condition was
dormant or asymptomatic. Modification of the instruction may be necessary
based upon the evidence in any given case.
References:
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987)
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966)
BAJI No. 14.65 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright ®
1986 West Publishing Company
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27.7

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

MUJI 27.7
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS
(Alternate B)
A person who has a latent, dormant or ^symptomatic condition,
or a condition to which the person is predisposed, may recover the
full amount of damages that proximately result from injuries that
aggravate the condition. In other words, when a latent condition
does not cause pain, but that condition plus the injury brings on
pain by aggravating the preexisting, dormant or asymptomatic
condition, then it is the injury, not the dormant or asymptomatic
condition, that is the proximate cause of pain and disability.
References:
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

27

If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such
damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for
the injury and damage sustained.

iw

INSTRUCTION NO.
In

awarding

such

damages,

you

may

consider

any

pain,

discomfort, and suffering, both mental and physical, its probable
duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
been prevented

from

previously enjoyed.

pursuing

the ordinary

affairs

of

life

as

You may also consider whether any of the above

will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future.

If so,

you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the
plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by
law to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering.
the opinion of any witness
reasonable compensation.
to

the

amount

compensation.

of

required

Nor is

as to the amount of

such

Furthermore, the argument of counsel as

damages

is

not

evidence

of

reasonable

In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall

exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you
evidence.

fix shall be just and reasonable

in light of the

DOCUMENT 7

APPENDIX 1
Dr. Petron's records (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) disclose:
A. Dr. Petron's records of September 22, 1998, state: "Objective: On exam she is diffusely
tender..." (Emphasis added.)
B. Dr. Petron's records of October 19, 1998: "Objective: On exam she has full ROM in
her neck, diffuse pain along the left parathoracic area." (Emphasis added.)
C. Dr. Petron's records of October 12, 1998: "Objective: On exam today she still
has some tenderness in the thoracic back and tender trigger points." (Emphasis added.)
D. Dr. Petron's records of December 17, 1998: "Objective: On exam she has full
ROM in her neck. She has some tenderness along the levator scapula right and left..."
E. Dr. Petron's records of November 11, 1998: "Objective: On exam today she has
fijll ROM in her neck. She has tenderness primarily along the left parascapular and cervical area."
(Emphasis added.)
F. Dr. Petron's records of April 14, 1999: "Objective: On exam there is tenderness
in the trapezius region and along the levator scapula..." (Emphasis added.)
G. Dr. Petron's records of May 25, 1999: "Objective: On exam she has tenderness
along the parspinal processes, some tenderness in the trapezius..." (Emphasis added.)
H. Dr. Petron's records of March 2, 2000: "Objective. On exam she has some
paracervical tenderness, negative NV exam of the upper extremities. She has mainly pain along the
upper trapezius." (Emphasis added.)
I. Dr. Petron's records of May 17, 2000: "Objective. On exam she has some
tenderness in the upper thoracic region, no point specific pain, negative NV, some limitation of

am

motion both thoracic and cervical spine, but primarily seems to be myofascial in nature.11
J. Dr. Petron's records of October 9, 2000" "With side bending it was difficult to the
left...Strength was equal bilaterally, though somewhat decreased with plantar flexion bilaterally."
(Emphasis added.)
K. Dr. Petronfs report of November 9, 2000: "Objective: On exam... She has several
tender and trigger points." (Emphasis added.)
L. Report of physical therapist Teresa Hall of September 23, 1998 (per referral from
Dr. Petron).(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1): The patient demonstrates 50% limitation in thoracic flexion due
to complaints of pain along the left paraspinous. Active standing lumbar range of motion is limited
25% in the left side bending with slight low back pain. Right side bending increases paid along the
left low back area, although motion is within normal limits. Standing flexion and extension are within
normal limits and the patient has increasing pain when returning to stand from a bent over position."

